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MINNECI V. POLLARD  
AND THE UPHILL CLIMB TO 
BIVENS RELIEF 
ELLIOT J. WEINGARTEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
If an inmate at a privately operated prison facility is the victim of 
Eighth Amendment violations, does he have an implied right to sue 
the prison employees? In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,1 the 
Supreme Court created an implied right of action against federal 
employees for federal constitutional violations. Minneci v. Pollard2 
asks the Supreme Court to expand this implied right of relief against 
employees of a privately operated prison facility.3 Over the past thirty 
years, the Court has consistently denied Bivens expansion to new 
categories of plaintiffs. Indeed, Harvard Law Professor Laurence 
Tribe wrote that Bivens is “on life support with little prospect of 
recovery.”4 Convincing the Supreme Court to grant a Bivens remedy 
is no easy task; under current law, there are many obstacles a plaintiff 
must overcome in order to obtain an implied right to relief. 
II.  FACTS 
Respondent Richard Pollard is a federal prisoner serving a 
twenty-year sentence for drug trafficking and firearms offenses.5 
Pollard alleges that he slipped and fell at the Taft Correctional 
Institution (TCI), was diagnosed with possible fractures of both 
elbows, and was referred to an outside orthopedic clinic.6 Before 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Stephen 
Sachs for his help and guidance in writing this commentary. 
 1.  403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 2.  Minneci v. Pollard, No. 10-1104 (U.S. argued Nov. 1, 2011). 
 3.  Brief for Petitioners at i, Minneci, No. 10-1104 (U.S. July 22, 2011). 
 4.  Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without 
Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 26 (2007). 
 5.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 3. 
 6.  Id. at 4. The Taft Correctional Institution (TCI) is a privately owned correctional 
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being transported, Pollard was forced to wear a restrictive “jumpsuit” 
and a “black box”7 mechanical restraint device, despite complaining of 
severe pain while wearing them.8 The orthopedic clinic recommended 
that Pollard wear a posterior splint around his elbow for two weeks.9 
Pollard, however, was unable to wear the splint because of inadequate 
facilities.10 In the following weeks, Pollard could not feed or bathe 
himself because of his injury and the prison staff failed to make 
alternative arrangements.11 Pollard was required to return to work 
before his injuries healed and again was forced to wear a “black box” 
restraint when returning to the orthopedic clinic for a subsequent 
appointment.12 
In 2001, Pollard filed a civil complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of California and named eight TCI 
employees as defendants.13 He alleged Eighth Amendment violations 
and sought damages against the individual TCI employees for 
providing inadequate medical care while he was housed at the 
prison.14 The district court adopted the recommendation of the 
magistrate judge and dismissed the case because the allegations 
lacked an implied remedy under Bivens and because alternative 
remedies were available to Pollard.15 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
After Bivens was decided, the Court expanded the doctrine over 
the following decade to include both Fifth and Eighth Amendment 
violations in limited circumstances. Since then, however, the Court has 
not allowed any new category of plaintiff access to a Bivens remedy. 
 
 
facility in California that contracts with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to house federal 
inmates. Id. Pollard was housed at TCI when the accident occurred. Id. 
 7.  Id. at 4–5 (“[T]he term generally refers to a plastic box that covers the lock of a 
prisoner’s handcuffs. A chain runs through the box and around the prisoner’s waist and secures 
his hands to his stomach.”). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 5. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 6. 
 13.  Id. at 8. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 7–8. 
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A.  Bivens and Its Expansion 
The remedy Pollard seeks was created forty years ago by the 
Supreme Court as a remedy for constitutional violations by federal 
officers. The original case, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 
created an implied damages remedy for victims of Fourth 
Amendment violations by federal agents.16 In that case, after federal 
agents searched and arrested Webster Bivens without a warrant or 
probable cause, the agents handcuffed him and threatened to arrest 
his family as well.17 The officers then took Bivens to a federal court 
where he was “interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip 
search.”18 The unreasonable search and seizure—and the perverse 
conduct of the officers—violated Bivens’s Fourth Amendment rights 
and subjected him to “great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental 
suffering.”19 The Court deemed a state law remedy inadequate for a 
federal constitutional violation20 and created an implied right of relief, 
allowing Bivens to recover money damages from the offending 
officers.21 
Eight years later in Davis v. Passman,22 the Court expanded the 
Bivens doctrine to include Fifth Amendment due process violations.23 
Shirley Davis, a female secretary to Congressman Otto Passman, was 
terminated from her position because Passman believed “that it was 
essential that [his secretary] be a man.”24 Davis brought a suit alleging 
that Passman’s conduct sexually discriminated against her and 
violated her Fifth Amendment rights.25 Passman claimed that “no 
private right of action” existed for the claim.26 The Court disagreed 
and again recognized an implied right of action for the deprivation of 
a constitutional right because “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
 
 16.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 
(1971). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 389–90. 
 20.  See id. at 392 (observing that the Fourth Amendment acts as a limit to federal power, 
and thus causes of action under the Fourth Amendment cannot be limited by state law or to tort 
actions under state law). 
 21.  Id. at 397. 
 22.  442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 23.  Id. at 234–35. 
 24.  Id. at 230 (quoting Letter from Otto E. Passman, Congressman, to Shirley Davis, 
Petitioner) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25.  Id. at 231. 
 26.  Id. at 232 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 4, Davis, 442 U.S. 228 (No. 78-572)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Amendment forbids the Federal Government to deny equal 
protection of the laws.”27 
Finally, in Carlson v. Green,28 the Court expanded the doctrine yet 
again and recognized that victims of Eighth Amendment violations 
can also obtain Bivens relief.29 The administratrix of an estate sued on 
behalf of her son because the deliberate indifference of prison 
medical staff caused his death.30 Relief under state law was 
unavailable but the parties disputed the availability of relief under 
federal law.31 Although the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)32 created 
a remedy for torts of this kind, the Court found that the FTCA does 
not preempt a Bivens remedy because employees are not individually 
liable under that statute.33 Rather, the intention of Congress was to 
allow for FTCA claims against the United States and Bivens claims 
against the individual employees.34 Making the FTCA and Bivens 
complementary causes of action creates “a more effective deterrent” 
against individual officers than an exclusive FTCA remedy.35 
B.  Bivens Contraction 
Since Carlson, however, the Court has refused to extend Bivens 
remedies to new categories of plaintiffs even when no adequate 
alternative remedies exist. Just three years after Carlson in Bush v. 
Lucas,36 the Court denied Bivens relief for a First Amendment 
violation by a federal employer.37 In Bush, a NASA engineer’s pay 
was downgraded significantly after he stated publicly that his job was 
a “travesty and worthless.”38 The engineer sued his employer, alleging 
a First Amendment violation and seeking damages under the 
 
 27.  Id. at 235 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 28.  446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 29.  Id. at 19–20. 
 30.  Id. at 16 n.1. 
 31.  Id. at 24. 
 32.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 2011). 
 33.  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19. Since the implementation of the Federal Employees Liability 
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100–694, § 5, 102 Stat. 
4563 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A § 2679(b)(1) (West 2011)), Bivens provides the only 
remedy against federal employees covered by the FTCA. The United States is the sole 
defendant in FTCA actions. 
 34.  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19–20. 
 35.  Id. at 21. 
 36.  462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 37.  Id. at 390. 
 38.  Id. at 369 (citation omitted). 
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rationale of Bivens.39 The Court determined that the administrative 
system created by Congress “provides meaningful remedies for 
employees who may have been unfairly disciplined for making critical 
comments about their agencies,” and denied Bivens relief.40 
The Court has also made Bivens relief unavailable to military 
personnel harmed through activity incident to service.41 In Chappell v. 
Wallace,42 the Court denied military personnel Bivens remedies when 
plaintiffs alleged equal protection violations by their superiors that 
resulted in the “fail[ure] to assign [the plaintiffs] desirable duties, 
threat[s], . . . low performance evaluations, and penalties of unusual 
severity.”43 The Court found “factors counseling hesitation”44 in “[t]he 
need for special regulations in relation to military discipline and 
consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system 
of military justice.”45 Moreover, the Constitution explicitly gives 
Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”46 
Additionally, the Court found in Schweiker v. Chilicky47 that 
wrongful denials of Social Security benefits resulting in due process 
violations do not give rise to Bivens liability.48 The remedy sought was 
“consequential damages for hardships resulting from an allegedly 
unconstitutional denial of [Social Security benefits].”49 A Bivens 
remedy, however, was refused because “Congress is the body charged 
with making the inevitable compromises required in the design of a 
massive and complex welfare benefits program” and the 
administrative process provided adequate relief.50 
 
 39.  Id. at 370–72. 
 40.  Id. at 385–86. 
 41.  United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 
305 (1983). 
 42.  Chappell, 462 U.S. 296. 
 43.  Id. at 297. 
 44.  Id. at 298 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 396 (1976)). 
 45.  Id. at 300; see also Stanley, 483 U.S. at 684 (“[N]o Bivens remedy is available for 
injuries that ‘arise out of . . . activity incident to [military] service.’” (quoting Feres v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950))). 
 46.  Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 47.  487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
 48.  Id. at 414. 
 49.  Id. at 428. 
 50.  Id. at 429. 
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In FDIC v. Meyer,51 the Court held that Bivens relief is not 
available against federal agencies.52 In Meyer, the FDIC took over an 
insolvent thrift institution and terminated a senior officer.53 The senior 
officer then sued the FDIC alleging that the summary discharge 
deprived him of a property right in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.54 According to the Court, the “logic of Bivens” did not 
support the remedy sought by the employee because the FDIC had 
authority to “take such action as may be necessary to put [the thrift] 
in a sound solvent condition.”55 
Similarly, in Corrective Services Corp. v. Malesko,56 the Court 
refused Bivens relief against a private corporation operating a 
halfway house under contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) because a Bivens claim must be alleged against an individual.57 
Moreover, “no federal prisoners enjoy[ed] [Malesko’s] contemplated 
remedy.”58 The Court stated that federal prisoners in government-run 
facilities alleging constitutional violations could bring Bivens claims 
against the offending officers.59 A prisoner cannot, however, bring a 
Bivens claim against “the officer’s employer, the United States, or the 
BOP.”60 Furthermore, the presence of adequate alternative remedies 
weighed against providing an additional Bivens remedy.61 
In Wilkie v. Robbins,62 the most important case in recent Bivens 
jurisprudence, a landowner sought Bivens damages against Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) employees who extorted him into granting 
an easement.63 In denying the landowner Bivens relief, the Court, with 
Justice Souter writing for the majority, created a test to determine if 
Bivens relief is available. First, the Court must ask whether an 
alternative, existing process exists.64 Although this can be a convincing 
reason to refrain from creating a new remedy, this question is not 
 
 51.  510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 52.  Id. at 473. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 473–74. The plaintiff claimed a Fifth Amendment right to continued employment 
under California law. Id. 
 55.  Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1)(A)(ii) (repealed 1989)). 
 56.  534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 57.  Id. at 71–72. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 74. 
 62.  551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 63.  Id. at 547–48. 
 64.  Id. at 550. 
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always dispositive on its own. The Court must look to the second 
question: whether there are “special factors counseling hesitation.”65 
Even if there are no existing alternative processes, those special 
factors may prevent the Court from authorizing a remedy.66 In Wilkie, 
the landowner had alternative and adequate administrative and 
judicial processes for “vindicating virtually all of his complaints”; thus, 
the Court denied Bivens relief.67 
C.  Decisions of Other Circuits 
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the specific issue in this 
case—whether private employees are liable under Bivens—but three 
circuit courts addressed this issue and denied Bivens relief.68 In Holly 
v. Scott,69 for example, a diabetic federal prisoner housed in a private 
prison facility attempted to sue the employees of the facility for 
inadequate medical care.70 The Fourth Circuit denied the plaintiff 
Bivens relief because of two factors, “each of which independently 
preclude[d] the extension of Bivens.”71 First, as employees of a private 
corporation, the defendants did not act under the color of federal 
law.72 Second, the availability of an alternative and superior cause of 
action under state negligence law counseled hesitation.73 Thus, 
because state law would have provided the plaintiff with an adequate 
alternative remedy, “[t]his [was] not a circumstance under which the 




 65.  Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 553–54. 
 68.  Holly v. Scott 434 F.3d 287, 288 (4th Cir. 2006); Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 
1090, 1100 (10th Cir. 2005) (dismissing a Bivens suit against private employees because of 
available state remedies and because “[t]he caution toward extending Bivens remedies into any 
new context . . . foreclose[d] such an extension here”); Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1254 
(11th Cir. 2008) (disposing of a Bivens claim against private prison employees because the 
employees were not federal actors and a state tort remedy was available). 
 69.  Holly, 434 F.3d at 287. 
 70.  Id. at 288. 
 71.  Id. at 290. 
 72.  See id. at 292 (“Defendants are not federal officials, federal employees, or even 
independent contractors in the service of the federal government.”). 
 73.  Id. at 295. 
 74.  Id. at 297. 
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IV.  HOLDING 
Despite these holdings, a split Ninth Circuit panel allowed Pollard 
to pursue Bivens relief.75 Because Bivens provides a cause of action 
only against an official “acting under the color of federal law,”76 the 
court first determined whether private prison employees act under 
color of federal law using the “public function” test.77 Under this test, 
a private entity engages in state action when exercising “powers 
traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”78 The court found that 
imprisonment is fundamentally a public function, regardless of 
whether the facility is managed by the government or a private 
entity.79 
The court then used the two-part Wilkie test to determine if 
Bivens relief was available.80 First, the court found that an “alternative, 
existing process” was in place, but that an existing process does not 
necessarily prevent the judicial branch from creating a new judicial 
remedy.81 The court stated that “the mere availability of a state law 
remedy” does not prevent the allowance of a Bivens cause of action.82 
According to the court, the policy underlying Bivens is that “the 
liability of federal officials for violations of citizens’ constitutional 
rights should be governed by uniform rules.”83 If state tort law 
precluded Bivens, the liability of federal officials would not be 
uniform because state tort law varies widely by state.84 Thus, state tort 
remedies alone cannot “displace a Bivens remedy under the first 
prong of the Wilkie test.”85 
 
 
 75.  Pollard v. GEO Group, 629 F.3d 843, 850 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. 
Minneci v. Pollard, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (U.S. argued Nov. 1, 2011) (No. 10-1104). 
 76.  Id. at 854 (quoting Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2003)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77.  Id. at 855. This test is traditionally used to determine if private individuals act under 
the color of state law for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2011). Id. 
 78.  Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 79.  Id. at 857 (“The relevant function here is not prison management, but rather 
incarceration of prisoners, which has of course traditionally been the State’s ‘exclusive 
prerogative.’”(quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982))). 
 80.  Id. at 859 (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)). 
 81.  Id. at 859–60. 
 82.  Id. at 860. 
 83.  Id. at 862 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 84.  Id. at 862–63. 
 85.  Id. at 863. 
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Second, the court found no “special factors counseling hesitation” 
that prevented the panel from allowing Bivens relief.86 The court 
considered the following as past special factors, which had previously 
disallowed Bivens remedies: (1) “whether it is feasible to create a 
workable cause of action”;87 (2) whether extending a remedy would 
undermine Bivens’s deterrence goals;88 (3) whether extending Bivens 
imposes asymmetric liability costs on privately operated facilities 
compared to government-run facilities;89 and (4) whether a unique 
attribute of the area gives reason to believe that congressional action 
is deliberate.90 After consideration of each factor, the panel concluded 
that none caused enough hesitation to warrant the denial of a Bivens 
remedy and that Pollard could proceed in his quest for Bivens relief.91 
V.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Petitioner Minneci’s Arguments 
Minneci argues that Pollard’s alternative remedies are adequate 
substitutes for a Bivens remedy and, alternatively, if the Court finds 
that those remedies are not adequate, that Minneci’s status as a 
private employee is a factor counseling hesitation. 
1. Pollard’s alternative remedies are adequate and superior 
substitutes for a Bivens remedy. 
Minneci argues that Pollard’s alternative remedies are adequate 
for four reasons. First, Minneci contrasts this case with the three cases 
in which a Bivens remedy was made available.92 In each previous 
case––Bivens, Davis, and Carlson––no adequate alternative remedies 
were available for the plaintiffs.93 Here, Pollard has an adequate 
alternative remedy in state tort law.94 Thus, Pollard should be denied 
Bivens relief because the Court “respond[s] cautiously to suggestions 
that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts.”95 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 555 (2007)). 
 88.  Id. at 863 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70–71 (2001)). 
 89.  Id. (citing Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72). 
 90.  Id. (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)). 
 91.  Id. at 869. 
 92.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 15. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 13 (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988)). 
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Second, Minneci contends that Pollard is most similar to the 
plaintiff in Malesko because Pollard’s alternative remedies are “at 
least as great, and in many respects greater, than anything that could 
be had under Bivens.”96 Malesko, like Pollard, was “‘not a plaintiff in 
search of a remedy’ like Bivens or Davis.”97 Instead, Malesko only 
sought an extension of Bivens, and the Court is cautious toward such 
expansion.98 Because Pollard is similarly situated to Malesko and 
seeks Bivens expansion, Minneci believes Pollard should also be 
denied relief.99 
Third, Minneci disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s determination 
that an alternative to Bivens relief must be federally created. 
According to Minneci, a state tort remedy is an adequate substitute 
for Bivens and alternative remedies need not be governed by uniform 
federal rules.100 The Ninth Circuit’s concern with state law remedies—
that plaintiffs in different jurisdictions might face different procedural 
requirements or be subject to limits on damages—should not concern 
the Court because these requirements “merely place all plaintiffs on 
the same footing when they bring suit for the same sorts of injuries.”101 
Thus, Minneci claims that alternative state remedies suffice as long as 
all plaintiffs in a particular jurisdiction enjoy equal remedies.102 
Finally, Minneci argues that the state law remedies available to 
Pollard are superior to a Bivens remedy because of California law.103 A 
general duty of care applies to all citizens104 and a heightened duty of 
care applies specifically to jailers because of a “special relationship 
between jailer and prisoner.”105 If Pollard could prove “injury resulting 
either from negligence or . . . [the] duty to protect him from 
foreseeable harm,” he would be entitled to damages.106 Additionally, a 
 
 96.  Id. at 20 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 97.  Id. (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74). 
 98.  Id. (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 73 (finding that a state tort remedy against a private prison management 
company was an adequate alterative to Bivens). 
 101.  Id. at 23. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 25. 
 104.  Id. at 26 (proposing that “as a general rule, persons have a duty to use due care to 
avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct injures another person” 
(quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 105.  Id. (quoting Giraldo v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 383 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2008)). 
 106.  Id. at 27. 
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constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment requires 
Pollard to prove that defendants were “deliberat[ly] indifferen[t] to 
serious medication needs,” causing “unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain.”107 Because “deliberate indifference describes a state 
of mind more blameworthy than negligence,”108 Pollard’s odds of 
succeeding in Bivens are less likely than in a negligence suit.109 
2. Even if the alternative remedies are not sufficient to deny 
Bivens relief, Petitioners’ status as private employees gives rise to a 
factor counseling hesitation that independently warrants reversal. 
Minneci also argues that as private employees they “lack the 
recognized immunities of their governmental counterparts, resulting 
in asymmetrical liability risks and eliminating a principal rationale for 
recognition of the Bivens doctrine.”110 Federal employees can claim 
qualified immunity when sued under Bivens, which decreases a 
plaintiff’s chances of success because qualified immunity “permits 
courts expeditiously to weed out suits . . . without requiring time-
consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits.”111 Minneci 
believes that lack of qualified immunity should concern the Court 
because Bivens claims against private prison contractors would be 
more successful than those against employees at government-run 
prisons.112 According to Minneci, authorizing asymmetric liability in 
Bivens suits is not a decision for the Court because of the hesitation 
“to create an anomaly whereby private defendants face greater 
constitutional liability than public officials.”113 Minneci argues that 




 107.  Id. at 28 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 108.  Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)). 
 109.  Id. at 28–29. 
 110.  Id. at 36. 
 111.  Id. at 38–39 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 112.  Id. at 37–38 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001)). 
 113.  Id. at 39 (quoting Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 294 (4th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 114.  See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72 (stating that authorizing Bivens liability “is a question for 
Congress, not [the Court], to decide”). 
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B.  Respondent Pollard’s Arguments 
Pollard presents two main arguments to demonstrate that a Bivens 
remedy is available here. First, Pollard argues that the Bivens doctrine 
encompasses all Eighth Amendment violations. Second, Pollard 
believes that the existence of state law remedies alone does not 
preclude a Bivens remedy. 
1.  Pollard advances three arguments supporting the claim that the 
Bivens doctrine encompasses all Eighth Amendment violations. 
Pollard argues that since Carlson, the Court has never 
distinguished between public and private employees acting under the 
color of federal law for the purpose of a Bivens remedy.115 Pollard 
analogizes the issue at hand to that in Carlson because, like that 
victim, Pollard is a federal prisoner who was tried, convicted, and 
sentenced for a violation of federal law.116 Additionally, Pollard claims 
Eighth Amendment violations by federal agents.117 Thus, Pollard 
argues that the application of Carlson permits him to receive a Bivens 
remedy.118 
If Carlson does not provide a Bivens remedy, Pollard argues that 
“privately held federal prisoners would be the only prisoners in the 
country unable to enforce their Eighth Amendment rights through a 
damages action.”119 In privately operated prisons, federal prisoners are 
often held in the same facilities, and even in neighboring cells, as state 
prisoners. If two prisoners held in the same prison suffer the same 
constitutional violation, two different remedies are available to them: 
state prisoners may pursue a § 1983 claim, while federal prisoners may 
only pursue a tort claim.120 Pollard believes the remedies should be 
uniform because private and public employees are not distinguished 
in Bivens cases.121 Indeed, Pollard contends that there is no 
significance to a company’s private status because in Malesko the 
private prison company was “in every meaningful sense, the same” as 
 
 115.  Brief for Respondent at 4–5, Minneci v. Pollard, No. 10-1104 (U.S. Sep. 12, 2011), 2011 
WL 4100439, at *4–5. 
 116.  Id. at 7. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 8. 
 119.  Id. (arguing that prisoners in publicly operated federal facilities can bring damages 
actions under Bivens, while prisoners in both publicly and privately operated state facilities can 
bring § 1983 actions). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 9. 
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the FDIC in Meyer.122 
Pollard similarly argues that Malesko supports his cause of action 
because Malesko brought suit not only against the private prison 
facility where he was held, but also against an employee at the 
facility.123 When the suit reached the Court, “the parties, the United 
States as amicus curiae, and the Court itself all assumed that a Bivens 
action against the employee would have been proper.”124 Despite 
denying the plaintiff Bivens relief against the facility, the Court stated 
that “remedies available to a privately held federal prisoner for a 
‘constitutional deprivation’ ought to mimic the remedies available to 
a publicly held federal prisoner for the deprivation—namely, ‘a Bivens 
claim against the offending individual officer.’”125 Pollard believes that 
this dicta supports his cause of action even though the plaintiff in that 
case never pursued a Bivens claim because the statute of limitations 
expired.126 
2. The existence of state law remedies does not independently 
preclude a Bivens action. 
Pollard argues next that Bivens relief is appropriate because 
privately held prisoners have no alternative federal remedies and 
because state remedies are not uniform.127 The purpose of the Bivens 
doctrine is the “deterrence of individual officers who commit 
unconstitutional acts.”128 This deterrence goal is grounded in 
separation of powers principles: although the Court can award 
damages to the victim of a constitutional violation, only Congress can 
create a statutory cause of action or prevent a Bivens remedy 
 
 122.  Id. at 9–10 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71 (2001)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 123.  Id. at 10. 
 124.  Id.; see also Brief of CSC at 13–14, Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (No. 00-860) 2001 WL 535666 
(arguing that privately held federal prisoners do not need Bivens remedies against the privately 
owned prison management companies because plaintiffs can bring actions against the individual 
employees who committed constitutional violations); Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 22, Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (No. 00-860) 2001 WL 558228 (“[I]nmates in 
private [federal] institutions already have remedies, remedies that parallel those available to 
(and adequate for) their publicly housed counterparts.”). 
 125.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 115, at 12 (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72). 
 126.  Id. at 10; see also Laubach v. Scibana, 301 Fed. Appx. 832, 837 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that “Bivens actions follow the same statute of limitations that applies to personal injury suits in 
the state where the action accrues”). 
 127.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 115, at 5. 
 128.  Id. at 24 (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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altogether.129 
Pollard cites four Bivens cases to demonstrate that the availability 
of state law remedies alone does not preclude a Bivens action.130 First, 
in Bivens itself, the plaintiff could have pursued his claim under state 
trespass law, but whether he could succeed in tort was unclear even 
though his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.131 Therefore, the 
tort remedy was found ineffective because of its inconsistency with 
the Fourth Amendment.132 Pollard believes that state tort law is 
ineffective to deter not just Fourth Amendment violations, but also 
Eighth Amendment violations because of this inconsistency.133 Second, 
Carlson recognized that because liability under the FTCA relies on 
tort law of the state where the misconduct occurred, the enforcement 
of federal constitutional rights should not be “left to the vagaries of 
the law of the several States.”134 Third, Malesko rejected a Bivens 
action not because state law remedies were available, but because of 
concerns that holding a corporate defendant subject to Bivens liability 
would undermine the deterrence rationale.135 The case was dismissed 
because a “suit against an individual’s employer was not the kind of 
deterrence contemplated by Bivens.”136 Finally, Wilkie was dismissed 
because of the availability of multiple non-federal remedies, and not 
state law remedies alone.137 Thus, Pollard argues that the existence of a 
state tort remedy does not automatically disqualify him from Bivens 
relief.138 
 
 129.  See id. at 24–25. 
 130.  Id. at 26. 
 131.  See id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 392 (1971)). While it was clear that Bivens suffered a Fourth Amendment violation, if 
a federal officer could have raised a consent defense to the state trespass suit, Bivens may not 
have recovered damages. Id. Thus, an independent cause of action was needed to ensure that 
constitutional rights were protected. Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. Much of the majority opinion in Bivens explains that state tort law does not protect 
the same interests as the Fourth Amendment because many Fourth Amendment violations are 
not torts. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392–94. Due to this gap, the creation of an implied remedy was 
necessary. Brief for Respondent, supra note 115, at 26. Pollard believes the same gap exists 
between Eighth Amendment violations and tort law. Id. 
 134.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 115, at 26–27 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 
23 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 135.  Id. at 27 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001)). 
 136.  Id. (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137.  Id. at 29–30 (citing Willkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 554 (2007)). 
 138.  Id. at 31. 
WEINGARTEN COMMENTARY 1.8.12 V.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2012  6:46 PM 
2012] MINNECI V. POLLARD AND THE UPHILL CLIMB TO BIVENS RELIEF 109 
VI.  ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
Despite his creative arguments, Pollard will face difficulty in 
convincing the Supreme Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, 
Justice Scalia wrote that “Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which 
[the Supreme Court] assumed common-law powers to create causes 
of action.”139 The Court likely will agree with the holdings of the 
Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and reverse the Ninth Circuit 
because it appears that any alternative remedy will suffice to displace 
Bivens. To defeat the more likely outcome, Pollard will face the 
difficult task of convincing the Court that he seeks a remedy currently 
available under Bivens and that he is not arguing for expanding the 
doctrine. 
A.  Pollard must first prove that private prison employees are federal 
actors. 
First, Pollard must demonstrate that privately contracted prison 
officials act under the color of federal law. While the Ninth Circuit 
answered this question affirmatively, convincing the Supreme Court is 
no easy task. The Court previously stated that “private individuals 
operated local jails in the 18th century” and “private contractors were 
heavily involved in prison management during the 19th century.”140 
Because of the long history of private jail operation, “correctional 
functions have never been exclusively public.”141 Also, privately 
employed citizens cannot claim qualified immunity, and without this 
defense, labeling them federal actors is unfair. Finally, private citizens 
have never been held liable under Bivens.142 Thus, the Court could 
reverse because of this factor alone. 
Pollard counters these assertions by stating that the use of private 
prisons does not prevent private prison guards from engaging in 
federal action. Just last year, the Court recognized that when 
incarcerated, “[p]risoners are dependent on the State for food, 
clothing, and necessary medical care.”143 Moreover, where the function 
 
 139.  Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 140.  Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 405 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 141.  Id. at 404–05. 
 142.  Federal employees are the sole defendants in Bivens actions. See, e.g., Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 (1980) (involving federal prison officials); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 
228, 230 (1979) (Congressman); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics). 
 143.  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
WEINGARTEN COMMENTARY 1.8.12 V.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2012  6:46 PM 
110 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 7 
of the contractor is identical to the function of a government 
employee, the state is not relieved of its constitutional duty.144 If the 
state fails in its duty, “the courts have a responsibility to remedy the 
resulting Eighth Amendment violation” whether the prison is 
government-run or privatized.145 It seems unlikely, but the Court could 
agree with this analysis and find that TCI employees perform the 
same federal function—incarcerating citizens for federal crimes—as 
the BOP employees sued in Carlson. If so, however, Pollard would 
then proceed to an analysis under the two-part Wilkie test. 
B.  The Court should find that Pollard’s alterative remedies are 
adequate to displace a Bivens remedy. 
Next, Pollard must convince the Court that his alternative 
remedies are inadequate. This is difficult because Pollard is 
advantaged in a California negligence case. In California, a special 
duty exists between jailers and prisoners to protect them from 
foreseeable harm.146 Additionally, Pollard’s allegations are actionable 
against both medical personnel in a malpractice action and against 
non-medical personnel in a negligence action. Pollard could also bring 
tort claims against the prison management company under a 
respondeat superior theory of liability147 not available in Bivens.148 The 
standard of abuse that Pollard would need to demonstrate in order to 
succeed under state tort law is much lower than what he would need 
to prove in an Eighth Amendment Bivens case.149 Accordingly, existing 
state law protects the same interests as the Constitution and, despite 
Pollard’s argument to the contrary, is sufficient to deny Bivens relief.150 
Pollard has access to alternative remedies here, and the Court should 
find them adequate to address his injuries. 
 
 144.  West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (holding that a when a state contracts physicians 
for prisoners, the states are not relieved of their constitutional duty to protect prisoners from 
Eighth Amendment violations). 
 145.  Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1928. 
 146.  Giraldo v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 147.  Pollard v. GEO Group, 629 F.3d 843, 871 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. 
Minneci v. Pollard, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (U.S. argued Nov. 1, 2011) (No. 10-1104) (citing Lisa M. v. 
Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 360 (Cal. 1995)). 
 148.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (recognizing that respondeat 
superior liability is not available in Bivens because personal involvement is needed for Bivens 
liability). 
 149.  See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991) (finding that “mere negligence” is 
insufficient to satisfy the burden of deliberate indifference). 
 150.  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). 
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Pollard must convince the Court that tort law and constitutional 
law do not protect the same interests, such that he needs a Bivens 
remedy to protect his Eighth Amendment rights. Pollard reads Bivens 
to suggest that state tort remedies are problematic because they 
under-protect federal rights.151 Although he believes Bivens supports 
him here, he is misguided. The Court in Bivens found that a federal 
officer might violate a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights without 
committing a tort.152 Thus, an independent remedy was needed to 
protect the gap between tort and Fourth Amendment law.153 Bivens is 
silent, however, regarding whether a similar gap exists between tort 
and Eighth Amendment law. Even Carlson, which authorized Bivens 
relief for Eighth Amendment violations, was predicated on the 
assumption that the plaintiffs could not recover in tort because of a 
technicality in state law.154 Pollard’s allegations, conversely, fit squarely 
within California negligence law, allowing him to easily recover in 
state court. Thus, because there is no gap between tort law and Eighth 
Amendment law here, Pollard does not need a Bivens remedy to 
attain proper relief. 
Furthermore, the Court is likely to agree with Minneci’s 
separation of powers argument—that Congress, not the Court, should 
determine whether a Bivens remedy is available. Pollard claims that 
the Court has declined Bivens remedies when Congress created an 
alternative remedial scheme.155 Thus, the Court should inquire not just 
whether alternative remedies are available, but whether the alterative 
remedies demonstrate “that Congress expected the Judiciary to stay 
its Bivens hand.”156 Here, Pollard asserts that because the briefs and 
 
 151.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
395 (1971) (holding that “state law may not authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth 
Amendment, neither may state law undertake to limit the extent to which federal authority can 
be exercised”) (citations omitted). 
 152.  Id. at 394–95. 
 153.  Id. at 395. 
 154.  See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (“Indiana law, if applied, would ‘subvert’ 
‘the policy of allowing complete vindication of constitutional rights.’”) (citations omitted). 
 155.  Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8, Minneci v. 
Pollard, No. 10-1104 (U.S. Sep. 19, 2011). 
 156.  Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 554 (2007); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 
412, 424–25 (1988) (denying a Bivens remedy because Congress established a remedial scheme); 
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 377, 388 (1983) (questioning whether an “elaborate remedial system 
that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy 
considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy”); Chappell v. 
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (“[A] judicial response by way of [a Bivens] remedy would be 
plainly inconsistent with Congress’ authority in this field.”). 
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the Court’s dicta in Malesko conceded the availability of a Bivens 
remedy against privately operated prison employees, the Court 
already found that Congress did not intend state remedies to preclude 
Bivens here. The Court, however, is not bound by this conclusion and 
is likely to consider all of Pollard’s alternative remedies in 
determining their adequacy as a substitute for Bivens. 
C.  Factors counseling hesitation independently warrant the denial of 
Bivens here. 
Finally, the second prong of the Wilkie test asks if there are 
“special factors counseling hesitation” that might cause the Justices to 
hesitate in administering the remedy. Here, allowing Pollard to 
proceed in Bivens creates two special factors counseling hesitation, 
each of which independently warrants the denial of Bivens. First, it 
would undermine the Bivens deterrence rationale because private 
employees do not have the qualified immunity defense that federal 
employees do. Second, granting Bivens liability here imposes 
asymmetric liability costs on public and private prison employees. 
First, Malesko recognized that “[t]he purpose of Bivens is to deter 
individual federal officers from committing constitutional 
violations.”157 Granting Pollard a Bivens remedy does not promote this 
goal because privately employed prison guards—who are already 
liable as individuals in tort and cannot claim qualified immunity—are 
deterred from committing constitutional violations without being 
liable in Bivens. Additionally, the plaintiff in a tort claim against a 
private employee must prove only negligence, as opposed to a 
heightened constitutional standard such as deliberate indifference.158 
Thus, because of the prospect of being individually liable in a tort 
claim and the substantial overlap between tort law and Eighth 
Amendment law, private employees are deterred from committing 
constitutional violations without being liable in Bivens. By contrast, 
Bivens is necessary for government employees because the FTCA 
substitutes the United States as a defendant in tort claims against 
them.159 This insulates federal employees from being individually 
 
 157.  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). 
 158.  See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991) (finding that “mere negligence” is 
insufficient to satisfy the burden of deliberate indifference). 
 159.  Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A § 1346 (West 2011); see also Westfall Act, § 5, 
Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (“Westfall Act”), 
Pub. L. No. 100–694, 28 U.S.C.A § 2679(b)(1) (West 2011). 
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liable for torts. As such, federal employees are only deterred from 
committing constitutional violations through the individual liability 
imposed by Bivens. Thus, because private employees are deterred 
from committing constitutional violations without the threat of Bivens 
liability, allowing Pollard to pursue a Bivens remedy does not promote 
the deterrence rationale. 
Second, the availability of a qualified immunity defense for 
federal government employees would impose asymmetrical liability 
costs if Bivens were allowed in this situation. Greater remedies would 
be available against private facilities than government-run facilities 
because of the qualified immunity defense. Because federal 
employees can claim qualified immunity while private employees 
cannot, and because qualified immunity “permits courts expeditiously 
to weed out suits,” a plaintiff’s chances are greater against private 
employees than federal employees.160 If plaintiffs are more likely to 
succeed against private employees, then private employees face 
greater liability costs then their government counterparts. Malesko 
made clear that Congress, not the courts, should determine the 
resolution of the asymmetry.161 If the Court believes that Congress 
should resolve this asymmetry, Pollard’s chances of success are slim. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Pollard faces an uphill battle to be granted Bivens relief. A holding 
in Pollard’s favor would expose government contractors to a 
substantial increase in liability and would open the door to federal 
courts to a broad class of plaintiffs. Such a holding would also 
contradict recent cases that denied extensions of Bivens into this area 
because of the availability of alternative remedies and other factors 
counseling hesitation. Thus, the Court likely will reverse the holding 
of the Ninth Circuit and deny Pollard Bivens relief. 
 
 
 160.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 38–39 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 
(1991)). 
 161.  Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72 (“Whether it makes sense to impose asymmetrical liability 
costs on private prison facilities alone is a question for Congress, not us, to decide.”); see also 
Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 562 (“‘Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact 
of a new species of litigation’ against those who act on the public’s behalf.” (quoting Bush, 462 
U.S. at 389)). 
